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Rejection from the Disability Insurance Program and Dependency on 
Social Support 
Abstract 
Recent studies find that many workers do not return to the labor force after their applications for 
Disability Insurance (DI) are denied. It is, therefore, important to understand how this group 
funds their consumption. This paper uses the Survey of Income and Program Participation linked 
to administrative data to examine the social support participation behavior of rejected applicants. 
By following cohorts of individuals from 10 years before to 10 years after filing for DI, this 
paper shows that rejected DI applicants are at most 10 percent more likely to depend on social 
support programs than healthy workers. More general models show that at the time of 
application rejected applicants are 25 percent more likely to depend on social support programs 
than healthy workers. These effects decrease across time, but up to 10 years after filing, rejected 
DI applicants are still up to 12 percent more likely to depend on social support programs. These 
are the same levels of social support participation exhibited by DI beneficiaries. While rejecting 
more DI applicants may reduce DI outlays, these results suggest that rejected applicants are more 
likely to depend on other federally funded assistance programs to fund their early retirement. 
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1 Introduction 
Most recent evaluations of the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program have found 
that the intrinsic nature of disability insurance creates an incentive for work capable individuals to leave 
the labor force. While the research for older cohorts has consistently found low disincentive rates on the 
order of about 30 percent, recent studies on younger cohorts have suggested upper bound estimates of 
approximately 50 to 60 percent.1 Many of the rejected applicants do return to work, but it is clear 
from these numbers that there is still a substantial proportion of rejected DI applicants who do 
not return to work post application. Since most recommendations to reform the DI program 
would result in lower acceptance rates, it is important to understand the behavior of rejected workers. 
More stringent acceptance rates may decrease DI rolls but it may come at the expense of other social 
support programs as rejected DI applicants search for alternative sources of income replacement. 
1See Bound (1989) and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) for estimates for older cohorts, and von Wachter 
(2011) for estimates for both cohorts. 
Evidence from recent evaluations of reforms to DI programs in other countries suggests that more 
stringent DI acceptance rates can result in increased dependency on other social support programs. For 
example, in the Dutch system, Borghans et al. (2011) find that a decrease in the generosity of DI benefits 
will have significant spillover effects onto other government programs such as unemployment insurance 
and general assistance. They estimate that for every euro saved on DI, the government has to spend an extra 
51 cents on other social assistance programs. In the Austrian system, Staubli (2011) examined the effect of 
stricter eligibility criteria for disability insurance. He found that the stricter criteria decreased DI 
enrollment, but it also increased unemployment benefits by 3.5% and sickness insurance benefits by 0.7%. 
In the U.S. context, there have been no policy reforms to exploit to answer this question, but we can 
glean some evidence from a study conducted by Bound et al. (2003) who examine the monthly income 
sources of DI applicants, using the 1990-1993 SIPP panels of data. When Bound et al. (2003) track these 
households three years before and after their DI filing date, they find that for rejected applicants there is no 
substantial change in the mean total monthly household income. The authors decompose household income 
by type (e.g., earnings, welfare income, spousal earnings, etc.), and find that the mean welfare participation 
rate of rejected applicants does not change post application. In an extension of their analysis, Bound and 
colleagues also follow a longitudinal sample of applicants, and provide estimates that show that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in changes in household income depending on where the household lies in the 
pre-application baseline household income distribution. Perhaps due to sample size limitation, the authors 
did not, however, provide quantile regression estimates by income source, so there are no results for public 
assistance income. Bound et al. (2003) note that one potential limitation of their study is the relatively short 
period of time that they are able to track households. They note that going back three years before the filing 
date may not adequately capture the full labor supply adjustments of the disabled worker. Burkhauser et 
al. (2001) have found using HRS data that 55% of SSDI applicants experienced work-limiting health 
conditions more than three years before their filing date and 36% experienced a work-limiting health 
condition more than10 years before. 
In this study, I track the social support participation of male cohorts rejected from the disability 
program. A focus on social support outcomes is warranted given the need to understand the potential 
ramifications of an increase in stringency for the DI program. Importantly, filing cohorts are tracked from 
10 years before to 10 years after first filing for DI. I show that by tracking cohorts from 10 years before, I 
am able to more accurately capture a baseline period before the onset of a work-limiting disability, and 
potential interactions between labor supply, social support participation and application to DI. As well, 
extending the follow-up period for up to 10 years after filing allows the worker to adjust to their denial. I 
construct the earnings history for each individual in the SIPP using administrative Detailed Earnings 
Records. The addition of this rich source of information provides a control for pre-application baseline 
earnings, a measure of labor force attachment. This is an important issue as there may be heterogeneous 
effects on social support program participation depending on where the household lies in the baseline 
earnings distribution. 
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I use the 1990 to 2010 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to 
administrative records made available by the Social Security Agency. These records include complete 
earnings and disability insurance application histories for all the subjects in the study sample. Using 
difference in difference models, I analyze how the social support participation of rejected DI applicants 
evolves from baseline to 10 years after the filing decision. I use two commonly employed control groups in 
the disability literature: healthy workers and DI beneficiaries. While the richness of the administrative data 
allows for a robust set of controls for pre-filing labor force attachment, it is still likely that rejected 
applicants differ in terms of health status. Therefore, the analysis provides two sets of parameters which are 
best viewed as upper bounds on the effect of being rejected from DI on social support participation. The 
first estimate answers the question: what is the average maximum change in social support participation 
that occurs when a worker who has applied to the DI program is rejected? The second estimate answers the 
question: what are the maximum average spillover effects from DI unto other social support programs? 
I find persistent, positive effects of applying and being rejected from DI on social support 
participation. These effects are greatest for younger filing cohorts where they range in value from a 
maximum of 24.9% in the year of filing to 11.9% 10 years after filing. For older cohorts the effects are 
lower but still persist. In terms of spillover effects, I find that rejected applicants are at least as likely, if not 
more so, to participate in social support programs as beneficiaries. Spillover effects are highest in the year 
after filing, approximately 3.6%, but are statistically significant only for older cohorts. 
This paper adds to the literature in several important ways. To start, this is the first paper to focus 
solely on rejected applicants, and to study the long term effects of being rejected from DI on social support 
participation in the U.S. Most literature on the DI program in the U.S. studies the disincentive effects of DI. 
In these papers the focus is predominantly on beneficiaries and on labor supply outcomes. As outlined 
earlier, one exception is the work of Bound et al. (2003), but their study covers only short-term effects 
(three years before and after filing) and they did not have the administrative data that I used in this study to 
control for lifetime earnings. Other similar studies to the present one, such as Borghans et al. (2011) and 
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Staubli (2011) have used data from European countries. Though they exploit extremely rich administrative 
data, these countries have different institutions and social support systems, making it difficult to determine 
their relevance to the U.S. labor market. If we are to implement more stringent DI acceptance criteria, there 
will likely be spillovers onto other social support programs. By comparing the social support participation 
of DI rejected applicants with two control groups, I provide a benchmark for policymakers to use when 
trying to infer the effect of more stringent DI acceptance rates on other public social support programs in the 
U.S. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section I provide a description of the data. 
This is followed in Section 3 by a description of the evaluation problem and the empirical strategies I will 
use to estimate treatment effects. In this section, I will explore the validity of the comparison group and 
discuss identification issues that arise when employing the selected control groups. In section 4, I present 
results from the different estimation methods. I also conduct additional analysis checks to see how sensitive 
the estimates are to labor force attachment and filing decade and discuss the implications of my findings. 
The final section concludes with a summary of the main results. 
2 Data 
The data assembled for this study consist of 1990 to 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) merged with restricted Social Security administrative records. By themselves, 
the SIPP panels are rather short; most track individuals every month spanning time periods of between two 
to four years, depending on the panel. With the merged information from the administrative sources, the 
data now include the entire earnings histories from 1978 to 2010 for all individuals with covered earnings 
and the entire Social Security application and award history for applications fielded between 1988 and 
2011. The inclusion of the earnings histories represents a marked advantage over most other datasets used 
to study the Social Security DI program because now the econometrician can control for earnings history 
and work experience with data that does not rely on self-reports. Likewise, the econometrician can also 
track the DI application history with the SSA administrative data. A detailed outline of the data sources 
4 
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used for this analysis is presented in Table 1. 
To construct the dataset, the SIPP is first aggregated by calendar year. It is then merged with the 
earnings records and DI histories based on the SIPP ID and calendar year. With the merge, SIPP 
participants now have a filing date if they applied to the DI program. Non-applicants do not have a filing 
date, so for analysis purposes I randomly assign to these individuals a filing date between 1990 and 2010. 
The main analysis sample consists of males, who are either applicants to the DI program or healthy 
workers, between the ages of 20 to 75 when we observe their program participation information in the SIPP. 
In addition, the only applicants in the sample were those that were between the ages of 30 to 65 when they 
first applied to the DI program.  The sample includes both Title 2 (SSDI) and Title 16 (SSI) DI 
determinations. An applicant was considered rejected if they had not received DI within 10 years of their 
application. These are primary applicants (not reconsiderations or higher levels of adjudication).2 The 
sample selection criteria were the same as used in other studies on the DI program (von Wachter et al., 
2011; Song, 2004). Applicants were only kept for filing years on or after 1990 and SIPP interview dates on 
or after 1989. Non-applicants were kept as a control group if their filing age was between 30-65 years based 
on their randomly assigned filing date. The resulting unbalanced panel dataset consists of 193,051 person 
year observations.3  
2 The median time between filing and final decision is 130 days, the 25th and 75th percentile are 
approximately 70 and 281 days respectively. 
3The frequencies of observations by time elapsed (lead or lag in years) between the date of the interview in 
the SIPP and the DI award decision from the SSA administrative data, along with further aspects of the data such as the 
number of observations from each SIPP panel, the number of observations by application year, and by date of 
interview from the SIPP, are relegated to the data appendix available upon request from the author. 
4The data is aggregated to two-year intervals to ensure large enough sample sizes for statistical inference. 
The data are structured as an event analysis where the event, the first application to the DI program, 
occurs at . The resulting dataset is unbalanced. Data for any of the time cohorts created (i.e. 
onsist of observations from any of the SIPP panels, and any calendar year. The 
fact that each time-event cohort is composed of multiple application year cohorts is an issue that I return to 
later. Each individual is then tracked across time in two-year intervals before or after the event.4 The 
sample is divided into three mutually exclusive groups. These are healthy workers, rejected DI applicants, 
0t =
t = −10  to t =10) may c
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and DI beneficiaries. People who report a work limiting or work preventing disability are not included in 
the analysis unless they are DI applicants.5 Summary statistics for the three groups are presented in Table 2; 
summary statistics are presented by whether the observation occurs in the years before or the years after the 
DI filing date. Presenting the data in this manner is a concise way to assess the comparability across groups. 
For young cohorts, men who apply to the DI program (Rejected and Accepted) are similar in terms of 
demographic characteristics. Compared to healthy workers applicants are more likely to be non-white, 
unmarried, and to have less than a high school diploma. All three groups are comparable in terms of age. 
5Work limited/prevented observations could not be included as a control group because I do not have a 
complete work limiting disability record or history for the workers in my sample. 
Participation in social support programs 
The SIPP collects program participation data for each individual for each month of a SIPP panel. 
For the purposes of this study, I track participation in any of the following social support programs: 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (or its precursor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children); 
General Assistance; the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (or its precursor, Food Stamps); and 
Unemployment Insurance. Participation in social support programs is coded “1” if an individual 
participates in any of these programs throughout a calendar year and “0” otherwise. As shown in Table 2, 
applicants to the DI program (shown in the columns labeled “Accepted” and “Rejected”), have similar 
social support participation rates before and after DI filing. For healthy workers, participation rates remain 
the same before and after filing. Comparing younger cohorts in Schedule A to their older counterparts in 
Schedule B: participation rates are lower in general for the older filing cohort. Young rejected applicants 
have participation rate increases, post filing, as high as 27.5%. 
In order to more clearly highlight trends in participation, Figure 1 tracks social support program 
participation rates from 10 years before to 10 years after DI filing. The graphs are presented by filing age 
cohort where “Younger” is defined as filing for DI between the ages of 30 to 44 and “Older” if filing 
between the ages of 45-62. The graph on the left presents the data for the younger cohort. There one can see 
that there is no change in participation rate across the 21-year interval for younger healthy workers. For the 
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+/- five years around the time of filing for DI, Figure 1 shows there is a peak in the social support 
participation in the year of filing. The peak tapers off approximately five years after rejection but results in 
a level shift upward in participation rates five to 10 years after filing. The program participation for the 
older cohort follows a similar pattern, but the post-filing level shift upward is much smaller. There is also a 
downward trend in social support participation for healthy workers. 
The descriptive analysis in both Table 2 and Figure 1 suggests that filing for and being rejected 
from DI has a much larger permanent effect on social support program participation for younger cohorts 
than for older. We will explore this further in the multivariate analysis in the next section. 
Work Outcomes and Work History 
The administrative earnings data provided the information to construct current earnings, earnings 
history, and experience variables. Table 2 shows that mean current earnings are lower for applicants, and 
lower yet for rejected applicants, compared to healthy workers. A worker is considered to participate in the 
labor force if they have non-zero earnings.
 than in the initial period . Earnings are 
$8,800 less than their pre-filing level. Mean current earnings are lowest after the DI decision, and lower for 
older filing cohorts. For comparison purposes, similar labor supply outcomes were also plotted for healthy 
applicants. As is expected, for younger healthy cohorts participation rates do not change significantly 
across time but earnings do increase. For older cohorts, labor force participation and earnings decreases as 
healthy workers age into retirement. These life-cycle patterns are evident in Figure 2. They also mirror the 
patterns seen in similar recent studies, (see for example von Wachter et al., 2011), and are evident in Table 2. 
6 Mean participation rates pre-filing are above 83% for all 
groups. After filing, the labor force participation of rejected workers does rebound, but not completely, and 
earnings remain lower. Figure 2 shows a more explicit picture of the labor supply dynamics of the study 
samples across time. The graphs show that younger rejected applicants do go back to work, but neither their 
earnings nor their labor force participation rebound completely. Labor supply of rejected applicants is 23 
percentage points lower in the final period ( 10)t = ( 10)t = −
6An alternative participation measure was generated based on the Federal minimum wage in a particular year, 
but given the larger amount of workers who earned less than this amount, I decided to use a less restrictive definition. 
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To control for past earnings, I calculated the mean of the top eight of the 10 years before the filings 
decision. From Table 2 the mean past earnings follow the same patterns as current earnings. Healthy 
workers earn on average approximately $12,400 more in the best eight out of 10 years prior to DI filing than 
rejected applicants. This difference remains after the DI decision as well. 
Work experience is defined as the number of years between 1978 and the year we observe the 
individual in the SIPP when the individual earns more than the annual federal minimum wage. Because this 
variable is created using information from the Detailed Earnings Record it exists for all participants in the 
study even if we do not observe them during their application year in the SIPP. Table 2 shows the mean 
cumulative work experience is highest for healthy workers at approximately 9 years for the young sample 
and 17 years for the older sample. For applicants, the mean cumulative work experience is lower and 
similar in magnitude before and after the DI filing. These findings suggest that rejected DI applicants do not 
gain work experience post-filing. Similar trends are noted for the older cohort as well. 
3 Methods 
In this study, I use the social support dependency of rejected DI beneficiaries and healthy workers 
over a 21 year period to estimate the effect of DI rejection on public social support dependency. If an 
applicant is rejected from the DI program, it is likely that their dependency will go up (compared to 
pre-application years) if they are searching for alternative non-labor sources to maintain their household 
income and/or if they are unable to switch off of state-run welfare systems. By comparing rejected 
applicants with various control groups, I can estimate the effect of being rejected on public social support 
programs. 
To implement this idea the treatment then is rejection from DI. The outcome of interest is social 
support program participation. The mean treatment effect is estimated using a difference in difference 
approach.7 The first difference is over time where observations before the filing date are compared with 
those after the filing date. The second difference compares the rejected disability applicant treatment group 
7The data available for this analysis are longitudinal, however, the sample is very unbalanced with very short 
panels. In order to exploit the time effects fully, it is best treated as repeated cross-sections. 
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with an untreated control group of healthy workers so that:  
 0 1 2 3 ,y G GT X Cβ β β β γ ε= + + + + +  (1) 
where y  is social support participation, G  is an indicator variable for being in the treatment 
group (rejected from DI), and T  is an indicator equal to 1 if the observation came from the period on or 
after the year of filing. Importantly, β2  denotes the mean treatment effect, that is, it provides an estimate 
of what the social support participation rate of the rejected worker would have been had they not applied to 
DI. The validity of this estimate rests on the assumption that we can control for the differences across 
groups. It is likely that rejected applicants differ from a control group of healthy workers by both their 
motivation for work and their health status. Observed earnings around the time of DI applications are 
affected by the interaction of applicants’ self-selection behavior and the substantial gainful activity (SGA) 
requirement. Generally, these earnings are considered to be endogenous; thus, they contain no useful 
information. Fortunately, the richness of the administrative data allows for the construction of measures, 
such as prior work experience and earnings, to control for motivation and prior labor force attachment. 
These measures, along with demographic information such as age, marital status, education, and race, are 
included in the vector of control variables X  . C  is a vector of calendar year dummies. 
There is no reliable measure of health status available in the data for all time periods. The SIPP 
contains information on presence of a work-limiting or work-preventing disability. Among rejected 
workers, 45% report having a disability 9 to 10 years after filing compared to 12% at baseline.
 will be less than the true counterfactual  . The 
8 It is, 
therefore, likely that workers with no history of a disability are healthier than rejected applicants. If this is 
the case, then rejected applicants may not be able to return to the labor force after they are rejected, and 
therefore their social support dependency will be higher.9 Using treatment effects notation, the estimated 
counterfactual [ (0) | 0]i iE y t = [ (0) | 1]i iE y t =
8Unfortunately, the date of disability onset is missing, which prevented this measure of health status from 
being useful for this analysis. Furthermore, the administrative data only contained reliable date of disability onset 
information for DI beneficiaries. 
9The upper bound interpretation will still apply if the rejected applicant remains out of the labor force to 
pursue further adjudications. 
                                                          
(3) 
estimate of the treatment effect is then best viewed as an upper bound on the true treatment effect, 2β  . 
in equation 1 is 
replaced with the interacted terms. The generalized version of 1 is then:  
It is clear from Figure 1 that the treatment effect s an average of the treatment effects across 
time. To fully exploit the panel nature of the dataset and estimate the treatment effect dynamics evident in 
social support participation, the group variable  is interacted with an expanded set of time dummies, 
now represented by the observation comes from time period 
2β  i
G
Tk  , where Tk =1  if k  where 
k∈ −[ 10,10]  , i.e., k  ranges from 10 years before to 10 years after filing for DI. GT  
 
10 10
0 1, 2, 3
9 10
.k k k k
k k
y T GT X Cβ α β β γ ε
=− =−
= + + + + +∑ ∑   (2) 
In this case, β2  is a vector of treatment effects with each element representing a time period. 
Treatment effects before the filing date provide estimates of any pre-filing adjustments that workers may go 
through. Likewise, the post-filing provides estimates of the time it takes the rejected worker to adjust to the 
DI filing decision. 
As discussed earlier, estimation of an unbiased treatment effect using this approach relies on the 
underlying assumptions that the treatment and the control group are alike in terms of both observed and 
unobserved characteristics; and the control group accurately captures counterfactual trends in social 
support program participation in the absence of the treatment. A close inspection of Figure 1 suggests that 
the control group follows the same trajectory as the treatment group from five to 10 years before the event, 
and five to 10 years after the event. To further test this assertion, I estimate the social support participation 
rates from baseline to 10 years after filing using the following specification where a control group indicator, 
U  , is also interacted with time to allow the program participation rate of the control group to change over 
time as well. 
 
10 10
0 1, 2, 3
9 10
.k k k k
k k
y UT GT X Cβ α β β γ ε
=− =−
= + + + + +∑ ∑  
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This specification was then used to test whether the trends in the treatment and control group are 
different at baseline (i.e., 8 to 10 years before filing). These estimates are presented in Figure 3. 
An inspection of Figure 3 reveals no trend in program participation of the healthy worker-control 
group at baseline. This is confirmed by examining estimates of the αk  parameters as laid out in equation 2, 
and noting that they are all statistically insignificant and do not vary from baseline (t=-10). Moreover, the 
treatment group, between (  and  )t = −10 t = −7 , does not exhibit a trend either. A Wald test of the null 
hypothesis that β2,−10 = 2, 8β −  gives an F-statistic of F (1,84829) = .012  with a p  -value = 0.912
. Similarly, a Wald test performed at the end of the study period, where β2,8 = 2,10β , results in an 
estimated F-statistic of F (1,84829) = .002  with a p  -value = 0.965 . Similar tests were performed 
for the older cohort sample and in all cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. While this is the first 
study to examine social support outcomes, other studies using earnings and labor force participation have 
gone as far back as 10 years, and have shown there is no interaction yet with the DI application (Giertz and 
Kubik, 2011; von Wachter et al., 2011; Song, 2004).). Song (2004), in his study of the earnings of DI 
applicants, contends that “pre-disability earnings appear to be the most suitable because they are ... 
determined years before the earliest application. Unlike earnings during the post-application period, 
pre-disability earnings can be considered to be exogenous with respect to DI application incidence.” I make 
the same assertion for social support participation -- by going back far enough, social support participation 
becomes exogenous, and both the treatment and the control group follow the same trajectory at baseline. 
4 Results 
The earlier descriptive analysis suggested clear post-filing differences in social support program 
participation of applicants rejected from the DI program. In this section, I present estimates for the 
difference in difference models outlined in equations 1 and 2. Table 3 reports estimates for the baseline 
model laid out in equation 1. The first column reports estimates with no controls, and column two reports 
estimates for the model that controls for demographics, prior earnings, current earnings, work experience, 
11 
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and calendar year dummies. The estimates are presented by filing age cohort. Schedule A shows that the 
mean effect of being rejected from the DI program for younger cohorts is approximately 11% but decreases 
to 10% when controls are included in the second column. The effects for the older cohort are much smaller, 
and are approximately 4% for both specifications. 
The estimates for the more general model outlined in equation 2 are presented in Figure 4 for the 
younger and older cohorts. The parameters are precisely estimated from 6 years before the filing date to the 
end of the study period for the younger cohort and for all periods for the older. In all of these time periods, 
the magnitudes of the parameter estimates are greatest for the younger cohort. Peak estimates for both 
cohorts occur during the file year t = 0  and they are, at most, approximately 25% and 19.5%, 
respectively. For both cohorts, the estimates decline post filing but still remain higher than at baseline, so 
that 10 years after filing for DI the estimated mean effect of being rejected on social support participation 
for each cohort is at most 12% and 7% respectively. These estimates suggest that there are long-term effects 
on other social support programs of applying and being rejected from the DI program. 
Effects by pre-filing labor force attachment 
To explore how the estimates differ by pre-filing labor force attachment, each sample is partitioned 
into two groups: those that make above the median income and those that make below, based on their mean 
pre-filing earnings. Median prior earnings for younger workers is approximately $20,797 and for the older 
filing cohort it is $28,223. Equation 1 is then estimated for these subsamples and the parameter estimates 
are reported in Table 4, columns two and three. For younger workers with lower labor force attachment, the 
treatment effect estimates are 9.7%. For younger workers with higher labor force attachment, the treatment 
estimates are 1.2 percentage points lower. For the older filing cohorts, the sample with lower labor force 
attachment has a treatment effect of 6.6%. The effect for higher labor force attachment and older workers is 
insignificant. Figure 5 plots estimates for the more general model outlined in equation eq:eq2.10 For 
younger and older cohorts with low labor force attachment, the mean treatment effects are similar up to and 
10Only the estimates for lowest labor force attachment groups are presented here. The estimates for the higher 
labor force attachment group followed a similar pattern but were lower in magnitude and insignificant in most cases. 
                                                          
including the year of filing -- approximately 23-24%. After filing, younger cohorts have higher treatment 
effects between 6 to 10 years after filing. At 10 years post-filing the treatment effect estimates are the same 
at 10% for the younger and older cohorts. 
Effects by Filing Decade 
As discussed earlier, the event data mixes together individuals from multiple calendar years into 
duration cohorts before, during, and after filing for DI. These “mixed” calendar year samples provide a way 
to infer the mean change in a worker’s program participation as long as each cohort is considered to be a 
random sample of the same population. If, for example, filers in the 2000s have higher baseline income than 
those in the 1990s, then this assumption would not hold unless controls were included for previous earnings 
history and labor force attachment. In the present analysis, I control for both. As noted earlier, these 
histories start at 10 years before filing for mean earnings, and go back to 1979 for experience variables. In 
addition, I include calendar year explicitly in equations 1 and 2 to take into account economic conditions. 
Nevertheless, there may be other changes in the underlying distribution of each filing cohort. For 
example, there may be a change in the underlying health distribution of rejected applicants towards better 
health. While I do not have the data to follow each filing year individually, I separate the data into filers in 
the 1990s and those in the 2000s. I then determine how sensitive the treatment effect estimates are between 
cohorts of individuals who filed in the 1990s and those who filed in the 2000s. Results by filing decade are 
presented in Table 4, columns (4)-(5). They show higher treatment effects for filers in the 2000s compared 
to the 1990s. The mean average effect of being rejected was 13.8% for filers between 2000-2011 and 4% in 
the 1990s. For older cohorts, the numbers were smaller at 1.5 and 5.2% respectively. Figure 6 plots the 
parameter estimates for the more general model. The estimates for all samples are either similar or higher in 
the 2000s. For older cohorts, the mean rates of participation are similar. For younger cohorts, post filing, the 
treatment effects are larger by 6% percentage points in the 2000s than in the 1990s (27.7% compared to 
21.6%). Ten years after filing, the rates of participation are very high for both cohorts in the 2000s. Controls 
were added in the models to pick up year effects (i.e., the Great recession), but even so, these differences 
remain. 
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Spillover Effect Estimates 
The above estimates use healthy workers as a control group for rejected disability applicants. If DI 
beneficiaries are used instead, the treatment effects identified can then be interpreted as spillover effects. 
Spillover effects are relevant because they tell us whether rejected applicants turn to other social support 
programs when they are rejected from DI. 
The estimated spillover effects are reported in Table 5. Without controls, the effect is 10.9%. When 
controls are included, the effect is 7.1% for the younger cohort (see columns one and two), and lower at 
2.9% for the older cohort. Estimates for the more generalized model of equation 2 are presented in Figure 7. 
The results reported in Figure 7 show that treatment effects are small and mostly insignificant, except for in 
the two years after filing for the older cohort, where the effects is 3.5%. In the long term there is no 
significant difference in participation rates. 
Figure 1 shows that the welfare participation of beneficiaries is equal to or lower than that of 
rejected applicants in most time periods for older cohorts, and in the time periods around the time of 
application  . If this is the case, then the desired counterfactual is actually greater than the 
observed behavior of beneficiaries:  . Since beneficiaries get a 
disability payment, they would be less dependent on social support programs than their rejected 
counterparts post-filing. The estimates provided here would then represent upper bounds on the spillover 
effects of rejection from DI into other government programs. 
[ 4, 4]t = − +
[ (0) | 0] [ (0) | 1]i i i iE y t E y t= ≥ =
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 5 provide estimates by labor force attachment and by decade. Spillover 
effects are more pronounced in 2000-2013 than they are in the 1990s as seen in columns four and five. For 
older filers the spillover effects are approximately 2.9% and largely concentrated among workers with low 
labor force attachment (see columns three and four). For younger workers the patterns are not as clear. 
Young workers with higher attachment have greater mean social support participation post filing at 10.7% 
compared to 6.6% for lower attached workers. 
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5 Discussion 
A worker is rejected from the DI program if, based on their medical condition and education or 
vocational experience, they are deemed to be capable of substantial gainful activity and work. Since many 
rejected applicants do not return to the labor force, this paper examines whether they use other social 
support programs to fund their consumption. The results presented here suggest that they are more likely to 
participate in federal social support programs than healthy workers. Moreover, the longitudinal estimates 
show that as the rejected workers approach the filing date, the treatment effects start to increase and reach a 
maximum in the year of filing, where rejected workers are on average 25% more likely to depend on social 
support programs than healthy workers. The effects then dissipate slowly so that at 10 years after they are 
still on average 12% more likely to depend on social support programs than healthy workers. The 
longitudinal estimates also show that the treatment effects are concentrated among workers who file at a 
younger age and who have lower labor force attachment. 
There have been no substantive changes in the disability awards process since 1984, but Autor and 
Duggan (2006), and more recently von Wachter et al. (2011), have suggested that there has been an increase 
in the number of applicants who apply to DI for economic rather than health motivations.11 von Wachter et 
al. (2011) finds, in his study of cohorts of applications in the 1990s and early 2000s, that workers in more 
recent filing years are more likely to apply to the DI program because of economic circumstances. If this is 
the case, then the underlying health distribution of rejected applicants would move towards better health, 
and more recent cohorts should have increased capacity for substantial gainful activity and decreased social 
support dependency. The estimates reported above by decade of application do not support the conjecture 
of decreased social support dependency. Younger filers had much higher treatment effects in the 2000s than 
they did in the 1990s. In the 2000s younger workers were 13% more likely to participate in social support 
programs than healthy workers. Contrast this result with 4% in the 1990s. 
11There were some smaller internal changes such as: increased public awareness campaigns designed to help 
potentially eligible individuals apply for benefits (in the early 1990s) and changes in the issuance for musculoskeletal 
listings and obesity that took place in the 1990s, however, these changes did not contribute meaningfully to increases 
in applications (SSA, 2006). 
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A further complication in the analysis of social support behavior of DI applicants is the potential 
interaction between the DI program and state-run welfare programs such as Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid. Wiseman (2011) and Burkhauser and Daly (2011) note that welfare 
programs such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), are administered at the state level and 
financed through block grants. As a result, states may attempt to lighten their welfare caseloads by 
encouraging recipients to apply to federally funded programs such as DI.12 If this is indeed a motivating 
factor in DI application, then an increase in the stringency of acceptance rates will hypothetically result in 
rejected DI applicants having higher welfare participation post-application. While my analysis does not 
provide specific estimates of this type of shifting behavior by states, it does provide evidence of whether the 
patterns in the data are consistent with welfare shifting. 
12The DI program consists of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and the Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. Both parts of the program require that the worker have a work preventing 
disability but the SSDI part of the program requires that you have at least 40 quarters of covered earnings while for the 
SSI program there is also an income criterion. For SSI you do not have to have covered earnings. Both Wiseman 
(2011) and Burkhauser and Daly (2011) focus on the SSI part of the program in their discussion. 
If welfare shifting is occurring, we should observe three patterns in the data. First, there should be 
an increase in the social support dependency of rejected workers relative to healthy workers -- we observe 
this. Second, we should see similar social support participation patterns between rejected applicants and 
beneficiaries before filing and then a divergence, as beneficiaries transition onto DI and away from other 
social support programs -- we observe this in our spillover effect estimates, albeit for only one time period 
following filing. That is, when the control group in the above analyses was changed to beneficiaries, the 
spillover effects from DI were estimated to be, at most, 4.3%. These spillover estimates varied across time 
with the largest magnitudes occurring in the first two years after filing, where rejected applicants were 3.6% 
more likely to participate in social support programs. In all subsequent periods the results were not 
significant. 
Finally, if welfare shifting is occurring, we should also notice that the spillover estimates by decade 
are higher in the 2000s, when welfare reform had already taken effect, than in the 1990s. This finding is also 
observed in the estimates, (at most 9.4% versus 3.4% in the 1990s). While these findings lend support to 
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and Wiseman’s and Burkhauser and Daly’s conjectures, they are by no means a conclusive test of welfare 
shifting. Further analysis by state, with more well defined time periods before and after the introduction of 
welfare reform, would need to be conducted to confirm their conjecture. Unfortunately, these data do not 
include geographical identifiers to allow this type of analysis and the sample sizes of rejected beneficiaries 
are not large enough to allow for shorter application periods than a decade.13 
13The younger and older filing cohort samples were divided into application cohorts: 1990-1995, 1996-2000, 
2001-2006, 2007-2011. The sample of rejected applicants in each of these application cohorts was too small to 
conduct longitudinal analysis. 
 
6 Conclusion 
One of the alternatives available to policymakers contemplating restructuring the DI program, with 
an aim of decreasing DI caseloads, is to adjust the program rules by strengthening disability criteria. Doing 
so would both deter people from applying and reject more applicants. The extant literature lends support to 
tightening eligibility criteria because of its focus on labor supply behavior and the finding that a substantial 
portion of younger rejected workers return to work. Even so, there are still a significant proportion of 
individuals in both younger and older cohorts who do not return to work and who do not return to their 
pre-filing earnings levels. In this paper, I explore potential ways to answer the question of how/whether 
more stringent DI eligibility criteria will affect dependency on other Federal/State social support programs. 
Obtaining credible estimates, or even reliable bounds on these estimates, is difficult in a setting such as the 
U.S. where there have been no policy changes that would allow researchers to exploit a natural experiment. 
In light of these circumstances, this paper examined whether rejected applicants are more likely to depend 
on social support programs post-DI filing compared to two reference groups: a group of healthy workers 
and a group of DI beneficiaries. In the first analysis, the treatment effect identified is the mean effect of 
applying and being rejected from DI. I present both an average estimate of the difference in social support 
participation and I show how this average is distributed over time with the treatment effects being largest 
around the time of filing. I also show that the effects of applying and being rejected from the DI program are 
permanent. Ten years after filing, rejected applicants are on average 13% more likely to participate in social 
                                                          
support programs than healthy workers. Larger effects are found for sub-groups of workers with lower 
labor force attachment or who were rejected from DI between 2000-2013. This study also estimates 
spillover effects of at most 7%. That is, rejected DI applicants are at most 7% more likely than beneficiaries 
to depend on social support programs. 
More stringent DI eligibility rules have two effects: they reject more people in the pipeline, and 
they discourage people from applying. For those applicants already in the DI application pipeline, if more 
stringent eligibility criteria result in more rejected applicants, then the spillover effect on other social 
support programs is likely to be even larger than the upper bound estimates presented here. Under the 
existing program rules, I have estimated upper bound spillover effects of 7%. With new tighter eligibility 
criteria, these spillover effects are likely to be higher if rejecting more people changes the underlying health 
distribution of rejected applicants so that on average they are unhealthier. If, on the other hand, tightening 
the eligibility criteria discourages people from applying altogether, then the estimates suggest that if 
rejected applicants did not apply there would be at most a 12% decrease in the social support participation 
of this population. 
Taken together, the findings of this paper suggest that policies that tighten eligibility criteria -- and 
increase the number of rejected applicants -- have the potential to impact other social support programs. 
This study shows that even for workers who are rejected, the act of applying seems to make them more 
likely to participate in social support programs. Policies that provide incentives to employers to intervene 
early and strengthen incentives for people with disabilities to continue to work would be one type of 
intervention that could be considered. 
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8 Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Data Sources 
Dataset Years Data Source Data Notes 
SIPP  1990-2008 Public Use 
Demographic, program 
participation and disability 
information. 
Detailed Earnings Recorda  1978-2010 Confidential Earnings histories. 
Supplemental Earnings Recorda 1978-2010 Confidential Earnings histories. 
 aSupplemental Security  1980-2011 Confidential Updated DI adjudications above 
the state level. 
 aMaster Beneficiary Record  1980-2011 Confidential Updated DI adjudications above 
the state level. 
a831 file: Disability Applications  1988-2011 Confidential DI application  
aThe administrative data were procured when the author was a Special Sworn Status researcher at the Social Security 
Agency. 
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 Table 2: Means 
21 
Before After 
Healthy Accepted Rejected Healthy Accepted Rejected A. Younger Cohort 
Married 63.1 46.3 46.1 74.4 48.6 49.9 
Nonwhite 13.2 18.6 22.5 14.3 24.7 27.6 
More than HS 60.4 36.2 32.7 65.3 38.3 40.8 
Age 32 33 32 41 42 41 
Labor Force Participation 94.7 87.5 83.1 94.8 33.2 61.5 
Current Earnings, 1,000s 21.1 11.8 9.0 28.7 2.4 5.7 
Previous Earnings, 1000s1 22.7 13.0 10.3 21.7 11.1 9.4 
Cumulative Experience 9 8 6 16 9 9 
Social Support Participation 7.4 17.1 16.5 6.7 26.6 27.5 
No. of observations 39589 2949 2785 40248 3406 2247 
B. Older Cohort 
Married 79.5 70.6 67.2 80.7 64.8 65.2 
Nonwhite 11.5 19.0 23.0 12.8 21.2 24.1 
More than HS 63.1 38.6 42.9 63.8 38.1 40.0 
Age 48 51 49 58 59 58 
Labor Force Participation 1 93.4 89.6 82.9 81.1 26.7 41.0 
1Current Earnings, 1000s  30.5 17.2 12.9 26.3 1.9 3.6 
Previous Earnings, 1000s1 32.9 19.2 14.9 31.5 17.0 15.2 
Cumulative Experience 17 15 14 21 15 14 
Social Support Participation 5.8 12.3 14.5 4.6 16.0 18.9 
No. of observations 40064 10867 4292 34270 8747 3587 
1Previous Earnings are the mean of the best 8 out of 10 years before filing. Labor force participation is an indicator for earnings greater than zero. Cumulative 
Experience is cumulative work experience (defined as having non-zero earnings) from 1978 to the present. All earnings are reported in real terms with 
1983-1984 as the base. 
 Table 3: Treatment Effects Estimates1 
 1 2 A. Younger Filing Cohort
β  1 9.5 
 
 
 
 
6.4 
 
 
 
(0.9) (0.9) 
β  2 10.9 9.7 
(1.6) (1.6) 
Controls X 
No. of observations 84,869 84,869 
B. Older Filing Cohort 
β  1 9.3 7.0 
(0.8) (0.7) 
β  2 4.3 4.2 
(1.2) (1.2) 
Controls X 
  
  
No. of observations 
 
82,213 82,213 
1This table provides estimates of the treatment effects in equation 1. Column (2) 
includes controls for marital status, race, education, a quadratic in age, current 
earnings, previous earnings, cumulative work experience, and calendar year 
indicators. The younger cohort is 30 to 44 years of age at DI filing. The older 
cohort is 45 to 62 at DI filing. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for 
clustering on person identifiers. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis I: Treatment Effect Estimates1 
  Prior Labor Force 
Attachment 
 
Application Decade 
Low High 1990s 2000s 
1 2 3 4 5 A. Younger  Filing Cohort 
β  1 6.4 6.0 2.8 9.6 5.4 
(0.9) (1.8) (1.6) (1.9) (1.0)  
β  2 9.7 9.7 8.5 4.0 13.8 
 (1.6) (1.8) (3.2) (2.5) (2.3) 
Controls X X X 
No. of 
observations 84,869 40,518 44,351 
 
41,728 
 
43,141 
 
B. Older Filing 
Cohort 
 
 
β  1
 
7.0 
 
 
7.1 
 
 
3.3 
 
 
8.6 
 
6.6 
(0.7) (0.9) (1.1) (1.6) (0.8)  
β  2 4.2 6.6 -1.1 1.8 5.2 
 (1.2) (1.5) (1.4) (2.0) (1.5) 
Controls X X X X X 
No. of 
observations 82,213 37,260 44,953 33,445 48,768 
1All specifications include controls for marital status, race, education, a quadratic in age, current earnings, 
previous earnings, cumulative work experience, and calendar year indicators. Column (1) repeats the treatment 
effects from the previous table for comparison purposes. Columns (2) -- (3) report estimates by pre-filing labor 
force attachment. The low attachment sample has mean pre-filing earnings below the median and the high 
attachment is above the median of mean pre-filing earnings. Columns (4) -- (5) report estimates by decade of 
filing: the 1990s and 2000-2011. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on person 
identifiers. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis II: Spillover Effect Estimates1 
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Prior Labor Force 
Attachment 
Application Decade 
Low High 1990s 2000s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 A. Younger Filing Cohort 
β  1 -5.67 -4 -4.08 -0.84 -1.28 -5.25 
(1.21) (1.26) (1.48) (1.97) (2.28) (1.56) 
β  2 10.94 7.1 6.57 10.73 3.36 9.35 
(1.59) (1.74) (1.98) (3.30) (2.80) (2.63) 
Controls X X X X X 
No. of observations 11,387 11,387 9,251 2,136 5,529 5,858 
B. Older Filing Cohort 
β  1 0.58 0.04 -0.28 0.88 -1.37 0.66 
(0.84) (0.85) (1.08) (1.16) (1.76) (0.98) 
β  2 4.31 2.93 3.75 -0.33 3.79 1.56 
(1.20) (1.21) (1.52) (1.49) (2.09) (1.61) 
Controls X X X X X 
No. of observations 27,493 27,493 19,642 7,851 11,158 16,335 
1The control group for these specifications is DI beneficiaries. Column (1)-(2) report the baseline treatment effect without and with controls. 
The control variables are marital status, race, education, a quadratic in age, current earnings, previous earnings, cumulative work experience, 
and calendar year indicators. Columns (3) -- (4) report estimates by pre-filing labor force attachment. The low attachment sample has mean 
pre-filing earnings below the median and the high attachment is above the median of mean pre-filing earnings. Columns (5) -- (6) report 
estimates by decade of filing: the 1990s or 2000-2011. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on person identifiers. 
 Figure 1: Social Support Participation 
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 Figure 2: Labor Force Participation and Earnings 
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 Figure 3: Estimated Change in Social Support Participation Rate By Comparison Group 
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 Figure 4: Estimated Treatment Effects 
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 Figure 5: Estimated Treatment Effects By Age Cohort - Lowest Earners 
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 Figure 6: Estimated Treatment Effects By Decade of Application 
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 Figure 7: Estimated Treatment Effects with Beneficiaries as the Control Group 
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